INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, economic and demographic forces, possibly along with the consequences of earlier housing and infrastructural policies, 1 has flattened the population-density gradient in metropolitan areas across the United States, while presumably reducing the vitality and dense social networks associated with most traditional city centers. In response, planning ideologies that are hostile to "unplanned," low-density development and that seek to promote highdensity, pedestrian-and environmentally friendly communities have been developed to combat these trends. But do scholars who study cities even understand the nature of cities well enough to formulate policies that impact cities in a positive way?
Economists do know that institutions matter, that human capital is important, and it is almost a cliche that cities are "engines of growth." All three of these views are thought to involve prompting the cultivation of ideas that contribute to entrepreneurship and innovation. But is our understanding of the relationship among cities, human capital, and economic development sufficient to effectively guide top-down urban and regional planning? We argue that the work of F.A. Hayek and Jane Jacobs strongly suggests the answer is "no." Specifically, studies at the metro-level that purport to show a positive correlation between density and economic growth and between density and the migration patterns of creative types do not stand up to closer examination. But this is not to deny that density, creativity, and economic development are linked, and we offer a different way of looking at density, "Jacobs density," that is more helpful in highlighting the limits of conventional land-use planning. We also argue that Hayek-Jacobs knowledge problems prevent even well-intentioned planners from solving many of the problems, some of their own making, that plague many central cities. In this light, reliance on entrepreneurial solutions, emerging from congenial micro-environments, offer the best hope for confronting urban land-use questions.
***
The outline of our paper is as follows. We begin by briefly discussing how spontaneous or unplanned orders, such as cities and related institutions, remedy the so-called knowledge problem without recourse to top-down direction. Next, we discuss the ways in which Smart Growth and the some of the policies of New Urbanism, by failing to appreciate the nature of living cities as spontaneous orders, 2 at least to the extent that Jacobs does, tend to adopt such a top-down approach in their land-use policies. We then offer a different way of looking at density that implies a significantly less aggregated measure of density, one that we feel is more consistent with the Hayek-Jacobs approach. Using Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data from the American Community Survey, we re-examine the correlations between density and economic growth. Given the severity of the knowledge problem, and thus what we don't know about the relation between human capital, cities, and economic growth, we argue that economic growth is best facilitated by enabling the formation of "congenial micro-environments," and that these cannot be the result of top-down planning. Finally, we offer some closing thoughts.
ORGANIZTION, CITIES, AND EMERGENT ORDER
The role of organizations is fairly well understood, although much of economic activity involves building "organizational capital" rather than "widgets" (Kling, 2009) . Moreover, there are other "shells" involved in production. The built environment, meaning structures and their relations in urban space, is an obvious example. The nature of urban form has been studied for many years, giving rise to a rich set of ideas and hypotheses. But the interaction question we pose above -regarding cities, human capital, and growth -is not easily treated via the canonical spatial equilibrium model of urban economics. 3 On the other hand, from Adam Smith to F.A. Hayek and Jane Jacobs, from the Invisible Hand to the Emergent Order, economists have developed and honed the idea that the bottom-up flow of information facilitates social cooperation and coordination in markets and, in particular, in cities. This result remains counter-intuitive to many, who associate order with top-down control and are not ready to part with the idea that cities require some sort of top-down planning. 4 Urbanization does bring with it the potential for externalities and coordination problems, and an emphasis on these problems has pushed many analysts towards advocacy of strict land use controls. But it is also true that many externality and coordination problems are resolved in land markets while others are resolved via private planning.
We are not, of course, the first to suggest that cities are spontaneous spatial orders (Jacobs 1961 (Jacobs & 1969 Webster and Lai, 2003) . Cities have been recognized as places where entrepreneurial discoveries, transactions-cost economies, and many potential positive externalities that can be realized. Indeed, the popularity of the writings of Jane Jacobs (among others) has prompted the recognition that spatial arrangements can emerge that cause the positive externalities (agglomeration economies) to dominate, so that it is possible to see cities as an emergent spatial order whereby flexible land markets facilitate favorable spatial arrangements. Jacobs (1961) , for example, has analyzed how the character of public spaces can help or hinder the emergence of safety and the kind of land-use diversity that is the foundation for entrepreneurial discovery, especially in large cities. The object is to place "eyes on the street" in large numbers around the clock so that people feel secure enough in public, where the majority of users are strangers to one another, to have the kind of informal contact that forms what Mark Granovetter (1973) has termed "weak ties" -the indispensible conduits through which knowledge of profit opportunities is transmitted. And this is achieved by allowing public spaces to create a diversity of interesting destinations, what she termed "primary uses," to attract people from outside the locality into the district or neighborhood and the population density to support this volume of traffic.
But such attractors presuppose that owners have the economic freedom to adjust land uses to unexpected changes in the socio-economic environment. That is, under normal circumstances local rules need to be flexible enough to enable owners to do this, even if it means a drastic departure from traditional uses or scales of operation. Converting old factories into mixed-use residential-shopping centers is one common example, but razing an historic shopping district and erecting an office complex in its place is another, keeping in mind that both the factory and the stores were quite possibly in their own day considered by some to represent sharp breaks with past uses. It is all part and parcel of competitive "gales of creative destruction" at the heart of "living cities," 5 which can be seen as a process in which entrepreneurs, both social and economic, cast aside established social ties in favor of newer, more profitable ones.
Again, in this light Jacobs (1961) , with her emphasis on the microfoundations of cities, is remarkably similar to the ideas of Hayek with respect to how complex social networks emerge spontaneously to handle and cultivate dispersed local knowledge and human capital. 6 As human capital is widely recognized as the key to economic development, the main question involves identifying the spatial arrangements where it thrives through interaction and communication via social networks. This, however, does not favor centralized decision-making.
Top-down governmental planning at the local level is hobbled by the well known limitations of central planning (Hayek 1945; Mises 1922) : top-down planners have no way to tap into dispersed local knowledge, what Jacobs (1961) refers to as "locality knowledge," and their actions are prone to politicization. In this way, private, non-governmental responses to collective-action and public-goods problems are instructive. For example, the fact that most Americans have the bulk of their assets (about two-thirds on average) tied up in their home has itself stimulated a demand for rules of neighborhood land use and neighborhood change, and so it is now standard practice in many places for developers to attach homeowner associations (HOAs) along with detailed governance documents to their residential developments (Nelson, 2005) .
Of course, such rules can come from city councils and zoning boards as well as from developers, but some scholars have pointed to a recent trend in the form of the emergence of "homevoter cities," typically small suburban municipalities with governments devoted to the maintenance of residential property values (Fischel, 2001 ) which has blurred the distinctions between HOAs and homevoter cities. It is unclear that the differences are significant. 7 Suffice it to say that each emerges in response to a demand for property rights clarity. Each governance arrangement offers a trade-off of rights surrendered for protections gained; each of which are subject to competitive pressures, suggesting that market forces vet the trade-offs. This process can be seen as bottom-up planning which is a source of flexibility as we have been discussing it.
But there is much more. Developers of shopping malls (and other planned unit developments) carefully plan and design all aspects, including use arrangements and common areas and facilities, to maximize rental incomes. This is simply planning in the pursuit of profit, benefiting from trial-and-error and very much dependent on local knowledge. It is a key aspect of what we might call bottom-up planning in order to highlight contrasts with the conventional association of "planning" with a top-down activity. The usefulness of bottom-up planning could be enhanced if top-down planning were left as the default, where private planning is least likely, perhaps a "governance of last resort." Holcombe (2004) has suggested such an approach. The actual division of responsibility between top-down and bottom-up planning would differ from place to place, although there are now significant efforts to strengthen the top-down role, in the name of "sustainability" (Utt, 2009 ).
SMART GROWTH, DENSITY, AND ALL THAT
Still, it is interesting that policy movements not known for their libertarianism, such as "smart growth," "new urbanism," "sustainable development," "livable communities," now claim Jane Jacobs as their own. Indeed, Jacobs's oncecontroversial ideas seem to have become the new orthodoxy, including her emphasis on the importance of population density, and today's conventional planning employs the concepts of "pedestrian-friendliness," "diversity," and "mixed use" as though they were taking their cue from Jacobs. Their interpretations of these concepts, however, tend to be off the mark.
Density or Diversity?
In the present discussion, it is crucial to understand that for Jacobs high population density is important because it helps to generate land-use diversity, and diversity in turn is key in fueling dynamic economic development. That is, density alone is not sufficient to generate economic development or land-use diversity. If it could, county prisons or the streets around Yankee Stadium as fans crowd into and out of games would be economically diverse and dynamic places -they are not. The former for obvious reasons and the latter because, while it may sustain specific consumer-oriented businesses such as baseball cap and hotdog sales, it is hardly the foundation for dynamic, long-term growth.
At the same time, long-term growth cannot take place without relatively high levels of population density. This is not only to generate high levels of demand for local products and services, but more importantly, again, to encourage "eyes on the street" in high concentrations at various times of the day, promote security, and the formation of social networks (Granovetter 1973 ) and social capital. These constitute the foundations of great cities, according to Jacobs, because they facilitate the informal flows of knowledge that entrepreneurs use to appropriately adjust land uses. Sustaining this diversity requires more economic activity than local residents can provide, which is why the ability to attract people, via primary uses, from outside the immediate area is so important for long-term development.
As areas grow economically, whether downtowns or suburbs, local population density rises, and as areas decline (again, whether downtown or suburbs) density falls. There is positive feedback as the expectation of economic opportunity in an area itself acts as an attractor. 8 People then attract more people, and this tends to create more economic opportunities, which in turn increases density.
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Primacy of Diversity For Jacobs, "diversity" refers mainly to the uses of public space. 10 We have already noted how population density is but one of the factors Jacobs identified as "generators of diversity" and that her primary concern was with diversity rather 7 An interesting debate between Fischel and Nelson concerns the question of whether HOAs and homevoter cities are complements or substitutes; see Nelson (2004) and Fischel (2004) . 8 The complementarity of the health of cities and their suburbs is articulated in Voith (1992) .
than density per se, and how density and diversity work together to promote the foundations of long-term entrepreneurial development. Diversity for her is diversity of land use, especially diversity in primary uses/attractors into a given area, as well as in the form of specialized shops (e.g., the Tokyo electronics district, "Akihabara"). This is "supply-side diversity."
Although not the same as ethnic diversity, but related to it, is an equally important "demand-side diversity," or a diversity in tastes. Jacobs (1969) argues that in order to sustain a diversity of uses that generate products on the supply side, there needs also to be a diversity of tastes to consume them. Fortunately, because great cities, cities with, say, populations in excess of one million, tend to attract misfits from smaller communities, one tends to find in them a disproportionately wide range of backgrounds and tastes compared to smaller cities and towns. The consumers of unusual products can reside in other cities, of course, but selling to consumers locally entails lower transactions costs, especially, again, in a dense urban environment, and demand-side diversity makes that possible.
As noted, one of the conditions Jacobs mentions for generating land-use diversity is that lively neighborhoods need "two or more primary uses" in order to encourage people to spend time in public space (e.g., sidewalks, roads, and plazas) at different times of the day. This sounds similar to what developers and planners today call "mixed uses," but Jacobs emphasizes that the uses in question be unique enough to attract people from outside the locality, which is why she distinguished them from what she termed "secondary diversity" -e.g., the restaurants, dry cleaners, and grocery stores -that merely service the people brought into an area by the primary uses (e.g., apartments, schools, office buildings, concert halls, notable restaurants).
Moreover, while there may be some justification for contemporary planners to describe planned developments that combine retail, entertainment, residential, and commercial uses as "mixed use," the kind of diversity Jacobs sees as the characteristic of long-term economic vitality is largely, though perhaps not exclusively, the result of an "organic" process, typically small-scale and at the level of the individual entrepreneur (although she didn't object to large-scale development per se). Today, developers and smart-growth planners, inspired by New Urbanism, 11 seem to want to skip the organic, evolutionary process and instead construct what they regard as the ideal outcome of that process. While some of these developments are small scale, many are very large-scale developments, (e.g., Hudson Yards in New York or "life-style communities") that purport to take advantage of the traditional downtown aesthetic. Many appear to be successful up to a point.
But as Jacobs points out, building on a large-scale in a given location not only imposes a deadening visual homogeneity, but also a homogeneity in the age of buildings (1961: Chapters 10 & 19) . New buildings require higher rents to cover construction costs compared to more aged buildings. Thus, what large-scale projects lack are cheap spaces in which to experiment with new ideas. Jacobs famously argued that "new ideas need old buildings" because aged or run-down buildings represent cheap space for new, typically young and relatively cash poor, entrepreneurs to experiment and, importantly, to fail without courting financial disaster. Unfortunately you can't build old buildings, which are the "naturally subsidized spaces" of economic development. 12 These problems are multiplied when it comes to publicprivate "mega-projects." The combination of new construction over a very large area with homogenous architecture (even when several architects are employed) rules out the kind of "old buildings" (or their equivalent) that can serve as incubators of entrepreneurship. While their high-priced spaces may sell, mixed-use or no, their prospects as engines of future economic growth are dim.
Walkability
Pedestrian friendliness is another lesson Smart Growth and New Urbanism seem to have drawn from Jacobs. Yet, making an existing area or a new development "pedestrian friendly" is a virtue only insofar as people have somewhere interesting to go to. Living cities are not full of pedestrians; they are full of people who are going somewhere. Megaproject developers often tout parks, sports complexes, or esplanades that will give people a place to go, but the really interesting aspects of cities are the unplanned niches that appear in the interstices of someone's grand plan -the space between the buildings. Otherwise the result is places that have the feeling of a "Disneyland" -nice places to visit but they lack the kind of real economic opportunity that comes with spontaneous diversity.
In sum, too many of those who claim Jacobs as a major influence have missed the spontaneous-order message (Jacobs 1961, Chapter 22) and have instead interpreted her descriptions of successful living cities more prescriptively than she intended. All of these areas are too large. Their average densities tell us very little. Whereas the importance of human capital to economic growth is well known and whereas the importance of urbanization is also clear, it is much more difficult to identify simple relationships between these two phenomena. We are unconvinced by the simple "density" and human capital relationships suggested by the authors cited in Table 1 .
DENSITY, JACOBS, AND DEVELOPMENT
Urban economists, including those who study creativity, simply define density as "number of persons per square area" per time period. There are at least two problems with measures of this kind. First, as Jacobs (1961: 205) pointed out, it is easy using this approach to conflate high density with "overcrowding," where the latter is based on "number of persons per room per dwelling." Thus, critics of density will point to poor, typically overcrowded cities with high density but low measured development to refute the density-development nexus. Indeed, overcrowding in this sense does occur in very low-income areas and does not promote economic development. But note that very high population density is consistent with the absence of overcrowding (e.g., the Upper East Side is one of the densest districts in New York City) and overcrowding is consistent with low population density (e.g., Appalachia). In fact, rising density and economic prosperity go hand in hand, even in the suburbs, towards which it is well documented that economic activity has been shifting since at least World War II. That is, while the population-density gradient has been flattening, especially in the United States, in the past half-century the right-side of the gradient, where economic activity has been shifting, has been rising as the left-side has been falling. In this way high and rising densities, without overcrowding, is still an indicator of prosperity.
But, second, we have already noted how the areas that form the denominator of the density ratio are typically far too large and fail to capture important differences at the neighborhood level, especially where, as has been the case in post-WWII urban development, cities have multiple "employment subcenters." 14 Typical measures cast too wide a net to capture meaningful relationships. One way to take these concerns into account is simply to select as a denominator the smallest areal unit for which credible data are available. American Community Survey data for the PUMS areas (PUMAs), which incorporate areas that are significantly smaller and far less aggregated than the usual metro or urbanized area measures.
NEIGHBORHOOD DENSTIES AND HUMAN CAPITAL: The Data
In defense of the authors cited in Table 1 , data for sub-city units are not easily found. For example, economic data for downtowns (Central Business Districts, CBDs) are hard to come by because there are no official or widely agreed on definitions. There are some employment as well as employment density data for the 50 largest CBDs at Demographia (http://www.demographia.com/db-cbd2000.pdf). We also have 50-year (1950-2000) population growth rates for 46 of the 50 surrounding Urbanized Areas and find that the correlation between CBD job density and urbanized area growth was -0.26. The importance of strong downtowns is seemingly not a driver of growth.
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Therefore, in an effort to study the effects of population density at the level of the smallest geographic units for which we could find useful data, we analyzed the American Community Survey (ACS) migration data for 2005 (5 percent sample). These are reported for areas as small as the PUMS (Public Use Micro-Sample) areas (PUMAs) which are the closest spatial units we have that might approximate neighborhoods (Murphy, 2007) . In 2005, there were 2077 of them in the U.S. (excluding Alaska), 1722 in metropolitan areas. Their minimum size is 100,000 inhabitants and their average population was just over 145,000. The PUMA-level migration data most useful for us involve moves between PUMAs, which accounted for 79 percent of all (within one-year) movers. The highest education level recorded in this file is MA+ (holders of all Masters and professional degrees and higher). Table 3 . These show correlations over the set of all "metropolitan" U.S. PUMAs, and suggest some of the complexity. We added data on migrants in PUMS occupation group 2600 ("Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations") as a proxy for people doing "creative" work (an idea popularized by Richard Florida [2002] and others). The correlation between PUMA density and arrivals of "creative" people was 0.25. But it was lower for the MA+ arrivals (0.180), even lower for arrivals with BA or BS degrees (0.13) and negligible for all arrivals (0.01). Nevertheless, one could argue that there were intriguing differences in the propensity to move to the denser places. But when we conduct the same analysis at the level of the nine Census Divisions (Tables 3-1 to 3-9) even this pattern disappears. For Divisions 1, 3,6,7,8 the correlation of density with arrivals is highest for all arrivals; for Divisions 2, 5, 9 they are highest for "creative" people; for Division 3, it is highest for the BA holders. And magnitudes of the correlations vary greatly among the Divisions. (2003) summarize much of this work. Using 1990 data, they also report their own findings on sub-center identification for 62 U.S. urban areas. They use these to test and confirm the implications of the Fujita-Ogawa model, in which the expected number of subcenters increases with metro area population and commuting costs. Redfearn and Giuliano (2007) present a case study of the twenty-year (1980-2000) evolution of sub-centers (that they identify) in the Los Angeles area. Generalized accessibility explains less than does historical importance. Lee (2006) describes a two-dimensional categorization of metropolitan areas which considers the number of employment sub-centers as well as the degree of employment dispersion. He identifies employment sub-centers for the largest metropolitan areas. The fourteen areas with populations of more than 3-million in 2000 were shown to have 233 sub-centers; the range was from as few as six (Philadelphia, Atlanta, Miami) to as many as 53 (Los Angeles). But the proportion of jobs not in any center (not in the downtown nor in one of the subcenters) varied from a high of 86.9 percent (Philadelphia) to a low of 68.4 percent (Los Angeles). Lee found that, as a group, commuters in dispersed job locations had shorter duration commutes than those working in sub-centers or in CBDs. Lee and Gordon (2007) estimate a metropolitan area growth model and find evidence that jobs dispersal contributes to commuting economies among the largest metropolitan areas; they accommodate growth by dispersing.
We can go a step further via multiple regressions. Tables 4a and 4b show estimation results for a migration model for all 2005 (inter-PUMA) migrants -in raw data (4a) as well as log-transformation form (all but 0,1 variables in logs in 4b). The model's explanatory variables are the population density of the receiving PUMA, the size (population) and per capita income of the metro area surrounding that PUMA as well as dummy variables for the nine census divisions (Pacific, Division 9, is the reference area). The metro area descriptors are included for the obvious reason that geographic context matters a great deal. All the independent variables are significant with the expected signs. People prefer to move to dense PUMAs located in high-income but small metros; they prefer New England or the Pacific. The long standing frostbelt-to-sunbelt migration is only partly in evidence.
Interestingly, this model breaks down when we use it to predict in-migration of our subgroups, those with BAs or with MA+ training or in the ENT occupations (Tables 5a and 5b) ; the model's explanatory power and the elasticities with respect to destination densities are much lower. The highly trained and the creative movers seemingly make more idiosyncratic choices than the general population.
TABLES 5a AND 5b HERE More than one researcher has shown that the established universities are now the magnets for enterprises that employ creative people (see, for example, Anselin, Varga, Acs, 1997). But prominent universities are not quickly or easily created. This suggests that such magnets cannot be easily manufactured via policy measures, as Florida's idea suggests.
While we believe these findings cast serious doubt on the usefulness of standard measures of density, they do not contradict the relation between development and density, rightly understood.
As we have seen, for Jacobs population density is important because it fosters the informal contact that creates complex social networks, the matrix of economic development, to form. Until recently the main source of this kind of contact was through foot-traffic. Today, of course, the car has perhaps irrevocably altered the shape of cities. But we believe that Jacobs's underlying idea is still relevant. With the car, having a high concentration of residents, workers, and users of public space within a particular area is not necessary. Thinking of density in terms of optimizing the number of potential informal contacts makes it consistent in principle with relatively low-density development and a car-dominated transport system. But what we will call "Jacobs density" refers to the level of potential informal contacts of the average person in a given public space 16 at any given time. This we believe captures the essence of the Jacobsian emphasis on density -i.e., as one of the conditions that promote the diversity of use and taste that is needed for long-term economic development -without being constrained by any particular historical context -e.g., Hudson Street in the Greenwich Village. The drawback to this measure is that data on Jacobs density may be hard to get, because it would have to combine measures of distance travelled per hour (say) of the average user of public space and the average number of public stopping points in which informal contacts could take place. (This goes as well for the kind of data that could distinguish between the overcrowding of rooms from high density, although we suspect there may be real-estate data that could supply this.) 17 However, we can say that the informal contacts that form social networks valuable for entrepreneurial discovery would be hard to imagine taking place absent an environment of economic freedom,
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CONGENIAL MICRO-ENVIRONMENTS
Congenial environments are micro-environments, perhaps smaller than PUMAs, and come in many "flavors". And although we would like to find a simple way to describe and summarize them, the available data do not permit it. Indeed, because urban environments are "spontaneous orders" par excellence (Ikeda 2007) , what an "optimal" density looks like adapts over time in unpredictable ways, and this means that such a measure is unlikely to be found. Here then our discussion will necessarily be more descriptive than quantitative.
For example, the rise of the "consumer city" is the logical response to the declining importance of location near prominent natural features, including ports, rivers, and canals. The increasing "footlooseness" of employment opportunities has meant that capital could follow labor, rather than the reverse, which had been the rule for centuries (Carlino and Mills, 1987) . This means that the quality of urban life is more important than ever. As Florida (2002) has emphasized, successful and attractive urban forms, then, must inspire productivity at work, but they must also be satisfying for non-work activities. who has achieved some acclaim for the centers that he has recently opened, reports that whereas the average mall visit is for about eighty minutes, people spend more than twice as much time when visiting his centers. The downside is that many of these new centers are populated with well known franchise stores and restaurants. There are few surprises. Jacobs would remind us that the charm of cities involves the possibilities of surprise -the good kind. Nevertheless, the suburbs do have places where people congregate. For example, Garreau has identified "edge cities," which typically begin as mall-like development, as just such places where, responding explicitly to Jacobs, he has declared that "density is back!" (1991:37).
CONVENTIONAL URBAN PLANNING
Many planners and policy makers have argued that low-density "sprawl" (the latter often undefined) is inefficient and have prescribed plans and policies to prompt more "compact" development. The commentator George Will has asked (of Al Gore and his fellow critics): "Does he worry that unsustainable growth will be sustained?" And it is unclear that any blanket prescription can be useful across the board. As we have noted, the well known Achilles Heel of central planning is planners' inability to discover or manage the dispersed knowledge that would be required. It is no different for cities. A Hayekian critique of urban dirigisme would also be a Jacobsian one. Large metropolitan areas include millions of parcels of land. Any presumption that managing the land uses involved is within the grasp of planners is naïve and hubristic. Open-ended free markets cannot easily be replaced.
The historian Kenneth T. Jackson wrote: "Since World War II, America's northeastern and midwestern cities have been in both relative and absolute decline. Their once proud central business districts have typically slipped into retail and business irrelevance; their neighborhoods have lost their once dense networks of bakeries, shoe stores and pharmacies; and their streets have too often become dispiriting collections of broken, broken windows and broken lives. After dark, pedestrians retreat from the empty sidewalks, public housing projects come under the sway of gangs and drug dealers, and merchants lower graffiti-covered metal gates. Too often, no one is home." (Ballon and Jackson, 2007) . The Lincoln Institute (2005) reported similar alarming findings in terms of vacant and abandoned housing. From census 2000 records, they found that in Cleveland there were 25,000 vacant and 11,000 abandoned residential properties; in Baltimore the numbers were 40,000, (14 percent of the housing stock) and 17,000; in Philadelphia, there were 27,000 abandoned residential structures (10 percent of the housing stock), 2,000 abandoned commercial structures and 32,000 vacant lots; in St. Louis 29,000 units were vacant which was equivalent to 17 percent of the housing stock.
Census data also show ( Table 6 ) that, for the set of ten largest central cities in these two regions, 50-year population growth was negative -while the U.S. population grew by 85 percent. Only one of the ten showed positive population growth and that was New York City, but by only an almost negligible one-percent. But it was another story for these areas' suburbs (here, the respective Urbanized Areas -not the MSAs -less the traditional central city). These suburban areas all grew; all but Pittsburgh's grew by more than the national population growth rate. To be sure, the older U.S. central cities boast islands of vitality and rebirth, but these are apparently swamped by the conditions that Jackson describes.
TABLE 6 HERE
The mix of companies and industries in the economy is always changing. Churn is widely recognized as part of normal economic activity. Schumpeter famously referred to "gales of creative destruction." Churn also occurs in cities and accompanies productivity growth. An interesting line of urban research by Duranton (2007) suggests that metro areas' ability to "churn" industries, letting go of the old and accommodating the new, accompanies their success. In his theoretical model, cross-industry innovations lead to the churning of industries across cities and cities grow or decline as a result of the realized local industrial churn. Glaeser has shown how Boston (Glaeser 2005) and New York (Glaeser 2009 ) have survived repeated crises and declines triggered by technology shocks -such as the emergence of steamships, automobile, and information technology -by reinventing themselves and accommodating the newly flourishing industries. Among the key assets needed to successfully respond to the recast challenges were rich a rich base of human capital and entrepreneurship in the two cities. Unlike these "reinventive" cities, Detroit may not survive the decline of the traditional U.S. auto industry. Simon's (2004) cross sectional analysis of 39 industries across 316 U.S. cities also demonstrated the role of industrial churn in the growth and decline of cities between 1977 and 1997, a period of burgeoning knowledge intensive economies. The presence of larger manufacturing shares and a sector's own employment share in the beginning year was associated with slower subsequent growth, especially in the newer and skill-intensive industries.
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Three conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, an almost uncountable number of federal state and local plans and policies were supposed to change the reality that Jackson describes, but it is hard to find their effect. Most labor and capital have for many years migrated to the suburbs of the older cities or to the sunbelt. Preferences have trumped policies. Yet (perhaps ironically) in the new era of "sustainability" concerns, policy discussions elaborate the importance of even more of the standard politicized top-down policies. Second, it is meaningless to aggregate into metropolitan units of analysis because, in many cases, the cities and the suburbs are so different. Analysts who write about cities, but who conflate the health of metropolitan areas with the health of their central cities (Glaeser, 1998) are making a mistake. Third, many of the older metropolitan areas have survived by growing outward. Rather than abandoning certain physical and social infrastructures, these have been rearranged so that the high costs of abandoning and replacing central city building stock could be avoided. Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) have pointed out that much of the old housing stock found in run down areas of older cities can be maintained at low cost and can continue to provide housing services for the low-income population.
So critics of "sprawl" are unhappy with auto-oriented development -as well as with automobiles -which is naturally different from the cozy street life that many reminisce over. But whereas this position has often been cast as a concern over negative externalities (highway congestion, air pollution, etc.), a newer set of criticisms suggests a lack of opportunities for positive externalities (interactions at work or at play). But the "market failure" view is once again overdone. Just as some investigators have found that there are spatial accommodations that mitigate the commuting costs of spread-out development (namely, job decentralization), there is also evidence, such as the suburban lifestyle centers described above, that innovative and creative interactions can occur in modern dispersed cities.
LESSONS
The various cities examined here reflect complex and somewhat durable peculiarities. Their infrastructures (broadly speaking) had at one time served as congenial social and economic environments. But as circumstances change, some cities adapt better than others. Are there specific principles that top-down planners can implement? Or is a trial-anderror bottom-up approach better suited? We have claimed that Jane Jacobs looked at cities and neighborhoods in Hayekian fashion. She appreciated the immense complexities involved and was pessimistic that they could be fathomed and usefully manipulated top-down. We agree. Of course, density, as we have defined it, remains important, and the kind of face-to-face contact and informal network-building described by Jacobs still serves as the foundation of living cities today, as they ever have. But relying on crude measures of density to fashion policy, whether to promote economic development in the traditional sense or to foster growth by somehow attracting "creative" denizens is unhelpful. Finally, the way the physical environment of cities has evolved in the 20 th century has perhaps made it harder to appreciate the role that the social infrastructure continues to play in economic development, and how it has adapted over time to changing circumstances of time and place. How it will adapt in the future no one can know, but we do know that, with economic freedom, adapt it will.
20 There is one more caveat to this discussion. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) note that "Housing supply elasticity will determine whether urban success reveals itself in the form of more people or higher income" (p. 983). This is, of course, correct but must it must be added that there is considerable research that demonstrates that housing supply elasticities have been substantially reduced in many areas because of local land use and development restrictions. In addition, when we study post-2000 growth of the 30 largest U.S. metropolitan areas, we see that eight of them (Dallas, Houston, Atlanta, Phoenix, Tampa, Denver, San Antonio, Indianapolis) experienced above-average population growth along with below average income growth; eight others (New York, Los Angeles, Boston, San Francisco, San Diego, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Providence) experienced above average income growth and below average population growth. But five metropolitan areas excelled in both (Miami, Washington DC, Seattle Portland, Sacramento); nine "nonsuccesses" underperformed in both (Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Milwaukee). The Brookings (2006) review of land use regulations suggests a typology of regulatory regimes. But the link between regulation, housing supply elasticity and the nature of growth is not clear in our 30-area analysis. 
